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Creative problem solving, in which novel solutions are required, has often been seen as
involving a special role for unconscious processes (Unconscious Work) which can lead
to sudden intuitive solutions (insights) when a problem is set aside during incubation
periods. This notion of Unconscious Work during incubation periods is supported
by a review of experimental studies and particularly by studies using the Immediate
Incubation paradigm. Other explanations for incubation effects, in terms of Intermittent
Work or Beneficial Forgetting are considered. Some recent studies of divergent thinking,
using the Alternative Uses task, carried out in my laboratory regarding Immediate vs.
Delayed Incubation and the effects of resource competition from interpolated activities
are discussed. These studies supported a role for Unconscious Work as against
Intermittent Conscious work or Beneficial Forgetting in incubation.
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What form might unconscious work take? On theoretical grounds, the notion that Unconscious
Work involves the same processing steps as Conscious Work but minus conscious awareness
is discounted, despite some recent arguments that the unconscious can duplicate any conscious
function. A candidate account in terms of spreading activation, coupled with below-threshold
but active goal representations, is put forward. This account could explain the emergence of
subjectively sudden intuitive solutions (Aha-insight solutions) as a result of unconscious processes
(Unconscious Work) during incubation periods.
“Intuition: the power of the mind by which it immediately perceives the truth of things without
reasoning or analysis; a truth so perceived, immediate, instinctive knowledge or belief.
Latin, in, into, upon, and tueri, tuitus, to look.” The Chambers Dictionary, 9th Edition, 2003, p. 778.
Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap.
Creative problem solving involves the production of approaches and solutions that are novel to
the solver even if not historically novel (Boden, 2004). Explaining the generation of personally
novel solutions is an unresolved issue for the psychology of thinking and problem solving.
Sometimes, problems seem to be solved by an immediate intuition or insight (e.g., Salvi et al., 2016)
but, with difficult problems, a period of conscious analysis is usually needed, even if it does not
directly lead to solution and the problem is set aside before solution. Why might setting a problem
aside facilitate solution? One popular explanation is that setting creative problems aside for a period
can allow unconscious processes to generate solution ideas, which are then experienced, either as
spontaneous breakthroughs into consciousness while attention is focussed on other matters, or as
very rapid solutions on returning to previously intractable problems. These solutions occurring
apparently rapidly and without awareness of intermediate steps, will be experienced as akin to the
dictionary idea of an intuition as a truth (a solution in this case) perceived without reasoning or
analysis.
The value of setting a problem aside for facilitating solutions has been a concern of theorists
in the area for at least the past 100 years. Wallas (1926, p. 80) drew on Poincaré’s (1910) earlier
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analysis of mathematical creation and labeled the stage in
which a problem is not consciously processed as “Incubation.”
(It is noteworthy that Poincaré himself did not use the term
“Incubation” in his 1910 paper, although he reported four
examples of incubation periods from his own experience of
creative work in mathematics). In Wallas’s analysis, Incubation
is proposed as a useful stage after conscious Preparation but
preceding Illumination (or Inspiration) and Verification. Clues
to processes underlying creative thinking should be found from
analyses of when and why Incubation can be useful. Subjective
reports by acknowledged creative thinkers over many areas of
work have supported the existence of incubation phenomena
(e.g., Poincaré, 1910; Ghiselin, 1952; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).
However, since such personal reports have often been given many
years after the events described, the reliability of such reports
is highly questionable. For example, frequently cited accounts
by Coleridge (composition of poem Kubla Khan in a dream),
Mozart (complete compositions coming to mind without error)
and Kekulé (discovery of benzene ring in a dream) have proven
to be false (Weisberg, 2006, pp. 73–78). Poincaré (1910) himself
based his own analysis of creative thinking on self reports of
problem solving episodes he had experienced nearly 30 years
previously. This is actually rather curious, as Poincaré was an
active researcher in mathematics at the time of making his
analysis of creative thinking and could presumably have drawn
on more recent episodes which would be less susceptible to recall
problems. However, after Poincaré (1910) and Wallas (1926),
who had relied on their own introspections and on subjective
reports by others (e.g., Wallas drew on daydream reports by
Varendonck, 1921), a substantial body of experimental work
research has been carried outusing both (a) insight problems, in
which t the solver has to develop a re-structuring of the task to
reach a unique solution and (b) divergent problems, that have
no single unique solution but in which many novel potential
solutions are to be generated. A typical divergent task, often
used in research studies, is the Alternative Uses Task. In this
task, participants are to produce as many uses as they can which
are different from the normal use in response to one or more
everyday items, such as a house building brick, a coat hanger,
a pencil, a paperclip, and so on (Guilford, 1967; Guilford et al.,
1978; Gilhooly et al., 2007).
Early work on incubation used a laboratory paradigm, known
as the Delayed Incubation Paradigm, in which participants work
on the target problem for an experimenter set preparation
time before being given an interpolated activity different from
the target task for a setincubation period before returning
to the target problem for a set post-incubation work time.
Performance in the incubation condition is compared with that
of the control condition in which participants work without
a break on the target task for a time equal to the sum of
preparation and post-incubation conscious working times in
the incubation condition. A recent alternative, the Immediate
Incubation paradigm, has an interpolated task immediately after
the instructions on the main problem before any conscious work
has been undertaken on that problem, followed by uninterrupted
work on the maint problem for a set time (Dijksterhuis and
Meurs, 2006).
DELAYED AND IMMEDIATE INCUBATION
EFFECTS
There is now considerable evidence from laboratory studies for
the benefits of Delayed Incubation, i.e., that setting a problem
aside after a period of work is beneficial (see Dodds et al., 2012,
for a qualitative review). A quantitative meta-analysis by Sio and
Ormerod (2009), of 117 studies identified a positive effect of
Delayed Incubation, where the overall average effect size was in
the low-medium band (mean d = 0.29) over a range of insight
and divergent tasks. Sio and Ormerod’s review also revealed that
the benefits of an incubation period are greater when participants
are occupied by an undemanding interpolated task than when
they engage in a demanding interpolated task or no task at
all. Overall, from narrative reviews and meta-analysis, it can be
concluded that the basic existence of Delayed Incubation effects
is clearly established, especially for divergent problem solving.
Concerning the effectiveness of Immediate Incubation
opportunities, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) found that
better performances when Immediate Incubation occurred after
decision problems or divergent tasks were initially presented.
Indeed, Nordgren et al. (2011) reported that Delayed Incubation
resulted in better decisions than Immediate Incubation and both
types of incubation were beneficial relative to No Incubation.
A meta –analysis (Strick et al., 2011) of 92 decision studies
found a significant beneficial aggregate effect size of g = 0.224
for Immediate Incubation. Their results also pointed to a number
of moderating factors, for example, beneficial effects were greater,
with more options, with shorter presentation times, with shorter
incubation times and with induction of a configural mindset vs. a
feature based mindset.
In creative divergent tasks Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006),
reported that responses were more creative on average, when
the divergent task instructions were followed immediately by a
short distracting task before producing uses for a brick, compared
to a control condition. We may note that the instructions in
this study did not ask for unusual uses, which is the norm
in divergent thinking tasks, and so it is not clear whether
participants had the goal of being creative. Participants may have
been reporting infrequent uses, that they happened to know,
rather than generating uses novel to them at the time of test.
Raters tend to score infrequent responses as creative, although
such uses may have been pre-known and therefore could reflect
memory retrieval rather than generation of subjectively novel
responses (Quellmalz, 1985). However, Gilhooly et al. (2012)
using more standard instructions with a stress on unusual uses
found a stronger beneficial effect of Immediate Incubation than of
Delayed Incubation with both incubation effects being superior
to control effects, scored for fluency and novelty of responses.
Thus, the benefit of immediate incubation was also found when
the task involved novelty (Gilhooly et al., 2012) as well as fluency
(Dijksterhuis and Meurs, 2006).
Zhong et al. (2008), applied the Immediate Incubation
paradigm to the Remote Associates Task (RAT), in which solvers
have to generate an associate common to three words (e.g.,
cottage, blue, mouse? Answer : cheese), and found that, Immediate
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Incubation activated solution words more on unsolved trials.
compared to solution word activation on unsolved trials where
that had been no Immediate Incubation.
Overall, it may be concluded from both meta-analyses (Sio
and Ormerod, 2009; Strick et al., 2011) and from recent studies
(Gilhooly et al., 2012, 2013, 2015) that incubation periods,
whether delayed or immediate, do have beneficial effects. The
main theories regarding mechanisms underlying incubation
effects will now be outlined.
THEORIES OF INCUBATION EFFECTS
Intermittent Conscious Work
This approach proposes that participants carry out intermittent
conscious work during the incubation period despite instructions
to be fully engaged on the interpolated task used to fill
the incubation period (Seifert et al., 1995, p. 82; Weisberg,
2006, pp. 443–445). Any conscious work during the supposed
incubation period would help reduce the time required when
the target problem was re-addressed – but conscious work
on the target task would be expected to impair performance
on the interpolated task. This theory has the merit of
parsimony and essentially explains incubation away as not
involving any special processes, such as intuitive unconscious
thinking.
Beneficial Forgetting
This view (e.g., Woodworth, 1938; Simon, 1966; Smith and
Blankenship, 1991; Smith, 1995; Segal, 2004; see also, Dijksterhuis
and Meurs, 2006) argues that “mental sets,” weaken during the
incubation period. Such “beneficial forgetting” facilitates fresh
starts or “set shifting” when the problem is taken up again
after the incubation period. As well as decay and interference,
misleading approaches may conceivably be weakened through
inhibition as proposed in the theory of retrieval-induced
forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994; Storm and Angello, 2010). Segal
(2004) proposed a variant (known as “Fresh Look”) in which
simply switching attention away from the main task allowed a
new start, with no forgetting or unconscious work proposed. The
Fresh Look view does not predict effects of Immediate Incubation
because with in that condition, there is insufficient opportunity
for sets or fixations to develop that need to be forgotten to enable
later progress.
Unconscious Work
On this account incubation effects involve active, but
unconscious, or intuitive processing. The term “unconscious
work” seems to first appear in the problem solving literature
in Poincaré’s (1910) paper (p. 328). Related phrases such as
“non-conscious idea generation” (Snyder et al., 2004) and
“unconscious thought” (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Ritter
and Dijksterhuis, 2014) are also used in the literature, but I
will use the phrase “unconscious work” throughout the present
paper.
Theoretically, what form might unconscious work take? For
example, could unconscious work be exactly like conscious
work, but with just one difference, namely that it is carried
out without any conscious awareness? Or is unconscious
work better thought of as some form of automatic spreading
activation along associative links, as against a conscious rule
or strategy governed activity? Wallas (1926) proposed the
idea of spreading “associative chains” as being active during
incubation, which can be seen as anticipating modern ideas of
spreading activation. Poincaré (1910) argued for quite specific
mechanisms of automatic idea generation and selection tailored
to his domain of interest which was mathematical creation. Both
Poincaré and Wallas argued that the suddenness of Illumination
or Inspiration coupled with the feeling of confidence in the
sudden insight arose from prolonged unconscious work. Wallas’s
analysis is often labeled as a Four Stage theory, incorporating
Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and Verification, but he
also proposed a sub-stage of Illumination which he dubbed
“Intimation” (Wallas, 1926, p. 97). This sub-stage is often
overlooked in discussions of Wallas’s analysis, although Wallas
considered it was important, practically and theoretically (see
also, Sadler-Smith, 2015, for an extended discussion of Intimation
in Wallas’s model). Intimation is the moment at the very start
of the Illumination period when the solver becomes aware
that a flash of success is imminent. Theoretically, Wallas saw
Intimation as reflecting increasing activation of a successful
association train which was about to become conscious. Thus,
Intimation was consistent with the view that Incubation involved
unconscious work. Practically, Wallas felt it was important that
the solver recognize the Intimation feeling and desist from
distracting activities to allow the solution to continue rising into
consciousness. Overall, unconscious work has long been favored
as a possible explanation of incubation effects. The question
of what specific processes might be involved in unconscious
work will be considered further in the Theoretical Discussion
section.
The possible mechanisms indicated above are not mutually
exclusive (or exhaustive). Delayed Incubation could involve all
three suggested mechanisms, with some intermittent conscious
work taking place when attention strays from the distracting
task during the incubation period and with some beneficial
forgetting and unconscious work also occurring when the solver
is consciously processing to the distracting incubation task.
However, a beneficial effect of Immediate Incubation would
not be consistent with the Beneficial Forgetting hypothesis in
that there is not time in the Immediate paradigm for sets
or misleading directions to be established, but the Immediate
paradigm would permit some intermittent conscious work
and/or some unconscious work.
THEORIES OF INCUBATION: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
Intermittent Work
As a check for intermittent conscious work during an incubation
period, performance on the interpolated task, during incubation,
should be compared with performance by a control group
using the interpolated task as a stand-alone activity. Impaired
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interpolated task performance during incubation would be
consistent with the hypothesis of some conscious work on
the target task during incubation. The argument here being
that intermittent conscious work represents a diversion of
resources away from the interpolated task and that should
impair performance on the interpolated task. Although this
may seem a basic methodological check for intermittent
conscious work, it does not appear to have been carried
out (Sio and Ormerod, 2009; Dodds et al., 2012) until quite
recently. In particular, Gilhooly et al. (2012, 2015) incorporated
suitable checks for intermittent conscious work on a target
divergent thinking task during the incubation period. In an
experiment involving delayed and immediate incubation and
two different interpolated activities (Gilhooly et al., 2012),
there was no evidence of impairment to the interpolated
incubation period tasks (which were mental rotations and
anagram solving) as a result of the tasks being carried out
during incubation periods, as against being carried out as
stand-alone tasks in control conditions. These studies also
found positive incubation effects, despite a lack of evidence
for intermittent conscious work. If anything, the trends in
the data were the opposite of those that would be predicted
by the intermittent work hypothesis. Mental rotation and
anagrams were somewhat (but not significantly) facilitated by
being carried out as distractor tasks during incubation. None
of the one tail predictions of the intermittent conscious work
hypothesis were upheld. An additional analysis examined the
correlations between performance scores on the interpolated
tasks and post-incubation scores on the target, divergent
thinking task. The Intermittent Work Hypothesis would predict
negative correlations in that the more attention given to the
interpolated task, the better the interpolated task scores would
be, and the worse would be the target task scores. Over
eight Pearson correlations examined, two were negative and six
positive; the average Pearson correlation between target task
and interpolated task performance measures was 0.11. Only
one correlation was significant (r = 0.36, p < 0.05, two tail)
and this was in the direction opposite to that predicted by
the Intermittent Work Hypothesis. This analysis of correlations
between interpolated task and target task performance measures
thus did not support the Intermittent Work hypothesis. A later
study (Gilhooly et al., 2015) using a target divergent thinking
task and mental rotations as the interpolated task in a
delayed incubation paradigm, also found no impairment in the
interpolated task relative to controls. Indeed, mental rotations
were significantly better performed as an interpolated task as
against as a stand-alone task, contrary to the Intermittent Work
Hypothesis.
In a related study, Baird et al. (2012), using thought
monitoring techniques, found that frequency of target task
related intermittent thoughts during incubation was not related
to quality of performance after the incubation period. So, it seems
that even if intermittent thoughts about the target task occurred
they were ineffective and did not explain the beneficial effects of
incubation. In conclusion, from Baird et al. (2012) and Gilhooly
et al. (2012, 2015), it seems safe to rule out the Intermittent Work
explanation of incubation effects.
Beneficial Forgetting
On this view, solvers often develop initial approaches that are
misleading and become fixated on these approaches. A break
allows such tendencies to become weaker and so a fresh start is
possible when the problem is resumed after an incubation break.
Smith (1995) investigated this possibility using word problems
presented either with helpful or with misleading cues. After
failures to solve, participants were given breaks of varying lengths
and then on returning to the task tried to recall the cues and
to solve. In the case of misleading cues, participants were more
likely to solve when they had forgotten the cues and likelihood
of forgetting increased with length of the break. The results
thus supported the idea that beneficial forgetting of misleading
information could be a factor underlying incubation effects.
Segal (2004) examined a variant of the Beneficial Forgetting
approach which may be labeled the Fresh Look hypothesis. On
this variant, simply switching attention from the target task is
enough and length of break is not important. His study involved
a spatial insight problem, in which a square has a parallelogram
superimposed on it and the task is to find the sum of the areas
of the two shapes. The problem is made easier when the solver
realizes that the shapes can be restructured as two equal sided
right angle triangles which, if slid, form a rectangle whose area
is easily calculated. Participants engaged in this target task until
they felt they were experiencing an impasse.
After impasse, participants were given 4 or 12 min on either
a demanding verbal task (crossword) or undemanding task
(browsing through newspapers) and then returned to the main
task for up to 6 more min.
Results indicated significant benefits for incubation break
v. no break, but no effects for length of break or for the
demandingness of the activity during the break. Segal argued that
these results were consistent with a the Fresh Look view, that
simply removing attention from the target task was sufficient and
that it was not important what was done in the incubation period
or how long it was. This study thus supports a role for attentional
shifting as a mechanism for Delayed Incubation. Together, Smith
(1995) and Segal (2004) are consistent with a role for Beneficial
Forgetting in the Delayed Incubation paradigm.
Unconscious Work
In contrast to Smith (1995), Segal (2004), and Dijksterhuis and
Meurs (2006) argued that in the Immediate Incubation paradigm,
the Beneficial Forgetting approach may be ruled out as there is
no period of initial work in which misleading fixations and sets
could be developed. Thus, if Immediate Incubation is shown to
be effective, the unconscious work hypothesis must remain in
contention for Immediate Incubation effects at least and would
also be a candidate explanation as one possible mechanism
for Delayed Incubation. Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) took
the beneficial effects of the Immediate Incubation paradigm
on a divergent task in their Experiment 3 as support for the
role of unconscious work in incubation. However, as already
mentioned, the task in this study did not clearly meet the usual
criteria for a creative task and the scoring did not distinguish
infrequent from genuinely novel responses. Hence, this study did
not unequivocally address creative thinking as against free recall
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of possibly rare but previously experienced events from episodic
and semantic memory.
Gilhooly et al. (2012) using explicit instructions to generate
novel responses did find that both delayed and immediate
incubation were effective in the Alternative Uses task and
that immediate incubation produced more facilitation than
delayed incubation. These results were consistent with a role
for unconscious work in divergent thinking, particularly for
Immediate Incubation, to which the Beneficial Forgetting
approach is not applicable.
Snyder et al. (2004) investigated the role of unconscious work
in the Delayed Incubation paradigm using a surprise return to the
target task. In this case, beneficial effects of incubation emerged,
consistent with the view that an automatic continuation of work
but unconsciously may have occurred after the task was set aside.
We may note that Snyder et al.’s (2004) task required simply
production of uses for a piece of paper as against novel uses. Thus,
this study did not necessarily require creative thinking as against
recall of previously known uses.
The interpolated tasks used by Segal (2004) and by
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) were different in modality
from the main tasks. Segal’s main task was spatial while the
interpolated tasks were verbal and Dijksterhuis and Meurs’s
study showed the opposite pattern in that their target task was
verbal but the interpolated task was spatial. The similarity–
dissimilarity relationship between target and interpolated tasks
could be important theoretically as the main competing
hypotheses suggest different effects of similarity between target
and interpolated tasks. If unconscious work is the main process
then interpolated tasks similar to the target task should interfere
with any unconscious work using the same mental resources
and so lead to weaker (or even reversed) incubation effects
when compared with effects of dissimilar interpolated tasks.
The unconscious work hypothesis suggests that when it comes
to incubation it would be helpful to “do something different”
from the target task. On the other hand, a forgetting account
would suggest that interpolated tasks similar to the target
task would cause greater interference, which would lead to
more forgetting of misleading approaches and thus enhanced
incubation benefits.
Helie et al. (2008) explored the effects of different interpolated
tasks on the reminiscence paradigm in free recall. This is
relevant to our present concerns because the reminiscence
paradigm is analogous to incubation, in that an initial free
recall is followed by interpolated tasks for a set period and
then the same free recall is attempted a second time. The
reminiscence score is the number of items recalled on re-test
that were not recalled on the initial free recall. Helie et al. (2008)
found that the more executively demanding the interpolated
tasks were, the lower were the reminiscence scores for picture
recall These results fitted well with Helie and Sun’s (2010)
Explicit–Implicit Interaction model which envisages unconscious
implicit processes running in parallel with conscious explicit
processes. Helie et al.’s (2008) result is consistent with the
Unconscious Work hypothesis for incubation in that more
demanding interpolated tasks will leave less resources available
for unconscious work. However, Helie et al.’s (2008) focus was
free recall from episodic memory rather than creative thinking,
which requires novel combinations and so, although suggestive,
and consistent with Unconscious Work, this result does not
directly address creative thinking which is the focus of the present
paper.
Ellwood et al. (2009) found a beneficial effect on number
of responses post-incubation of a dissimilar interpolated task
in a Delayed Incubation experiment. However, this study used
a fluency of uses task rather than a novel uses task. Also,
as Ellwood et al. (2009) pointed out, although their findings
are consistent with an explanation in terms of unconscious
work, an explanation in terms of selective relief of fatigue
could also be invoked to account for the effects of similarity
between incubation and target tasks. On this view, for example,
a spatial Delayed Incubation task very different from a main
verbal task could facilitate more recovery from fatigue specific
to verbal processing than might an interpolated verbal task.
Gilhooly et al. (2013) included tests of the effects of the
similarity between incubation and target tasks in an Immediate
Incubation paradigm, so that where fatigue as an explanation
could be examined. The Gilhooly et al. (2013) study factorially
varied incubation activities (verbal – anagram solving vs.
spatial – mental rotations), used either a clearly creative verbal
divergent task (alternate uses) or a clearly spatial divergent
task (mental synthesis) and both divergent tasks were scored
for novelty as well as fluency. Significant incubation effects
were found, but of most interest were the interactions, in
that spatial incubation benefitted verbal divergent thinking
more than did verbal incubation activity and verbal incubation
activity benefitted spatial divergent thinking more than did
spatial incubation activity. These results supported a role for
unconscious work during incubation periods in creative thinking
tasks and did not support the hypotheses that incubation effects
are due to Beneficial Forgetting or attention shifting. The
Beneficial Forgetting account predicted the opposite pattern of
facilitation (i.e., that similar incubation and target tasks would
be more beneficial than different modality incubation and target
tasks).
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
From recent research discussed above relating to the three main
explanations for incubation effects, viz., Unconscious Work,
Intermittent Work, and Beneficial Forgetting, it seems that
given the effectiveness of Immediate Incubation, in which sets
are unlikely to have been developed, the Beneficial Forgetting
hypothesis can be ruled out for immediate incubation at
least. In addition, Gilhooly et al. (2012, 2015) found no
support for the idea of Intermittent Work, from studies in
which suitable control conditions were included. Unconscious
Work thus remains as the best candidate explanation for
the effects of Immediate Incubation periods and it handles
the effects of similarity between incubation and target task
Gilhooly et al. (2013). Gilhooly et al. (2013) found that
Delayed Incubation was beneficial, but less so than Immediate
Incubation in a divergent thinking task (Alternative Uses).
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It could be that in Delayed Incubation, sets do build
up during the initial period of conscious work, and are
then reduced by Beneficial Forgetting, after which useful
unconscious work could come into play. In contrast, with
Immediate Incubation, there are no sets to be overcome and
beneficial unconscious work can start sooner than in the
Delayed paradigm leading to better performance than with
Delayed incubation. Overall, however, the Unconscious Work
hypothesis is in contention for both Delayed and Immediate
Incubation.
However, the question still arises of what processes might
be involved in unconscious work? Could unconscious work
processes be identical toe conscious work processes with the sole
difference that they are executed without conscious awareness?
This issue will now be addressed.
Unconscious Work?
Conscious work is generally rule or strategy governed. Could
unconscious work also be rule governed? Poincaré (1910, p. 329)
considered the possibility of a “subliminal self ” that worked in
the same way as the conscious self, but without consciousness,
and might even be a superior “self ” since it could find solutions
that evaded the conscious mind. Kounios and Beeman (2015)
illustrate this notion of a subliminal self by supposing that
a man has the job of solving long anagrams during office
hours. Suppose the person concerned works systematically
all day, on the day shift, from 9 am to 5 pm, trying to
solve say, “iaiaeiaeiiamsnrtnmhslbtssdtn,” but when he leaves
at 5 pm it is still not solved. Another worker takes over
and continues the systematic search on the night shift, from
where the first worker left off. At 7 pm the night shift worker
phones through to the day shift worker with the answer (cf.,
insight) saying “It’s “antidisestablishmentarianism!””. In this
example, the second shift worker represents the unconscious
and works just the same way, using systematic search, as the
day shift worker; but, the day shift worker is not aware of
the night shift worker’s activities until the answer is phoned
through.
To explore further the idea that unconscious work might
be a subliminal version of conscious work let us consider
conscious processing in the Alternate Uses task. This was
addressed in a think aloud study of the Brick Uses task by
Gilhooly et al. (2007) in which it was found that participants
used strategies, such as scanning the target object’s properties
(“Bricks are heavy”) and using the retrieved properties to cue
and infer uses from semantic memory (“Heavy objects can hold
down things like sheets, rugs, tarpaulin and so on, so a heavy
brick could do those things too”). Could unconscious work
essentially duplicate this form of conscious work but with no
awareness. As we have argued previously (Gilhooly et al., 2012,
p. 976).
“The standard view in cognitive science is (a) that mental contents
vary in activation levels, (b) that above some high activation
level mental contents become available to consciousness, (c) that
we are conscious of only a limited number of highly activated
mental elements at any one time (that is, the contents of working
memory) and (d) that strategy or rule based processing, as found
in Gilhooly et al.’s (2012) think aloud study, requires such highly
activated (conscious) material as inputs and generates highly
activated (conscious) outputs.”
On the standard view then, conscious work requires the
highly activated contents of working memory and highly
activated material is necessarily in consciousness. Overall,
it seems impossible that unconscious processes could really
be exactly like conscious processes in every respect except
that of being conscious. For example, using the rules of
arithmetic and temporary working memory storage processes
to multiply two 3 digit numbers (e.g., 364 × 279 = ?) is
surely impossible without highly activated representations in
working memory of the numbers, goals, and intermediate
results. The short term representations involved in mental
arithmetic would seem to be necessarily conscious. It seems
impossible to carry out unconscious multiplication of two or
three digit numbers. (With practice of course, one can learn
and store three digit multiplication results in long term memory
which can be directly retrieved by a type of unconscious
process. However, this t is not mental multiplication). Poincaré
(1910, p. 334) made a very similar point when he wrote
“It never happens that the unconscious work gives us the
result of a somewhat long calculation all made, where we
only have to apply fixed rules.” In conclusion, the idea that
unconscious work or thought processes could be just the
same as conscious work processes with the sole difference
that they lack awareness of any mental content, seems
unlikely.
However, a challenge to this conclusion has been recently
put forward by Hassin (2013) who argues in favor of what
he labels a “Yes, It Can” (YIC) principle. According to YIC,
unconscious processes can perform the same fundamental,
high level functions that conscious processes perform. While it
would be generally accepted that the elementary (fundamental?)
component processes in carrying out 364 × 279 = ?, are
unconscious (e.g., the first step of 364 × 279 is likely to
be 9 × 4 = 32, which involves a direct retrieval process
that occurs without conscious concomitants in adults practiced
in basic multiplication at least) and many such steps and
processes are needed, yet precise results need to be held in
working memory and precise goals need to be formulated in
an organized way (executive processes) all of which seems
impossible without mental contents activated to conscious
levels. Hassin cites some experiments (Sklar et al., 2012) which
appear to show priming in subliminally presented additions
and subtractions involving two and even three digits. However,
these are far from the long calculations with intermediate
results that Poincare discussed as difficult for the subliminal
self. Exact calculations cannot realistically be made purely by
priming which would activates associatively related numbers
and not just the correct ones which are needed at every
step of a long calculation if it is to be successful. Similar
points apply to all types of problem solving which require
multiple steps to be carried out and multiple intermediate
results to be held along the way between presentation and
solution.
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Assuming unconscious work cannot actually be just the same
in terms of processing steps as conscious work, of what then,
might unconscious work consist?
Poincaré (1910, p. 333) drew on Epicurus’s (341–270 BC)
ancient-world theory of atoms as having hooks so that these
elementary building blocks of nature could combine with each
other. He imagined ideas like hooked atoms hanging on a wall
before relevant ideas/atoms are set in motion during Preparation
and continue in motion during Incubation. As with molecules
of a gas in a container, the atoms/ideas collide at random and
sometimes the hooks snag and a new combination is formed.
The atoms initially set in motion can strike atoms at rest and
may combine with them. This would represent initial ideas
being combined with new ideas so that the products of random
combination would always have some relation to the starting
conditions of the problem.
Campbell (1960) drew on a range of pre-cursors of his view
who had stressed the role of extensive trial-and-error in creative
work (Bain, 1874; James, 1880) and he was strongly influenced
by Poincaré (1910). Campbell argued that creative problem
solving involves a quasi-random generation of associations
between mental elements (“Blind Variation”) to produce novel
combinations of ideas, some of which may be useful and so be
subject to Selective Retention. This approach draws an analogy
with biological evolution in which random changes in genetic
material lead to changes in organisms, some of which are useful
and hence retained by natural selection. Similarly, it is argued
that ideas are modified in creative problem solving in ways which
are blind to the final solution and only by chance lead ultimately
to modifications that solve the problem and are retained for
future use. Campbell (1960) quoted extensively from Poincaré’s
(1910) account of creative thinking in mathematics, as involving
extensive quasi-random search, although Campbell did not stress
any special role for unconscious processing. His concern was very
much with the role of blind trial-and-error, whether carried out
at a conscious or an unconscious level. It could be argued that
Campbell saw productive conscious creative thinking as like the
unconscious work proposed by Poincaré (1910).
Simonton (1995, 2003) developed Campbell’s ideas and used
the notion of “mental elements” which are similar to Poincaré’s
(1910) “hooked atoms.” However, unlike Campbell, Simonton
stresses the role of unconscious processes which lead to new
combinations, some of which are retained and selected to enter
consciousness on the basis of their “stability.”
In terms of current approaches to cognitive processing,
how might novel combinations come about? Parallel spreading
activation processes in a semantic network could lead to remote
and unusual associations (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). One specific
proposal is that of Helie and Sun’s (2010) Explicit–Implicit
Interaction model. In this model, incubation is regarded as
involving unconscious, implicit, stochastic associative processes
that demand little attentional capacity in contrast with conscious
explicit rule governed attentionally demanding processes that run
in parallel. In this model, activation spreading through implicit
networks during incubation periods leads to novel associations
which could facilitate later work when conscious processing
resumes and the explicit level processes and knowledge interact
with the implicit level processes and knowledge. The model does
not seem to deal with incubation leading to a breakthrough
of solutions into consciousness without an explicit return to
the task. According to Dijksterhuis and Nordgren’s (2006)
Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT), unconscious thought, or
work, is parallel, bottom-up, inexact, and divergent; whereas
conscious thought is, serial, exact, and convergent. Thus, the
characteristics of unconscious thought, as envisaged by UTT are
consistent with incubation effects.
Overall, there is general agreement among many theorists
that unconscious thinking, or unconscious work, in the form
of implicit associative processes involving spreading activation
[similar to Wallas’s (1926) concept of “associative trains”], is a
possible explanation of incubation effects.
How might the suddenness of inspiration be explained?
Both Poincaré and Wallas saw this feature of creative thinking
as indicative of prolonged unconscious work that found a
solution and delivered it to consciousness. However, here
Poincaré identified a problem for the unconscious work account.
How did the good idea become selected for promotion to
consciousness? Poincaré was focussed on mathematical creation
and he proposed that in this domain selection was based on
the mathematician’s special intuitive sensibility to beauty in
mathematics and further that the subliminal self possessed this
intuitive sensibility. Poincaré’s theory, as stated in the 1910
paper, is narrow in solely addressing mathematical creation;
generalization to other fields, such as poetry, music, physics,
and so on, would require specific intuitive sensibilities to be
proposed for those fields. An alternative possibility that has
general applicability, is that when a problem is set aside, a
goal representation remains active for extended time periods,
although below the threshold for consciousness. The active goal
representation would tend to boost activation flow into associated
solution-relevant paths and when a solution combination of
associations or a single relevant association became active, the
solution and the goal representations would mutually activate
each other in a positive feedback loop leading both to become
conscious as their activations pass threshold levels. It is suggested
that this rising activation (or “rising train of association” as
Wallas put it) is experienced as Intimation. The present account
has the benefit of automaticity and is parsimonious in not
requiring special sensibilities to be invoked. The sub-threshold
but active goal representation automatically does the work of
selecting promising solution –relevant associations.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND
LIMITATIONS
Overall, it can be concluded that the field, although still
acknowledging the pioneering work of Poincaré and Wallas,
has made considerable progress. The existence of incubation
as a beneficial stage in creative thinking has been established
through a large number of empirical studies (Sio and Ormerod,
2009), so that the field does not depend on potentially
unreliable introspective accounts. New paradigms, such as
Immediate Incubation have been established and have helped
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justify a role for implicit Unconscious Work. Theoretical ideas
have been sharpened and refined and the joint effects of
spreading activation and subconscious goal activation provide
a candidate 9 explanation for insight or intuitive solutions
following incubation. The approach put forward here, in terms of
spreading activation and goal representations, is most applicable
to relatively small scale but knowledge rich problems such as
divergent thinking tasks. Further work is needed to develop
the present approach for knowledge lean problems, such as
laboratory insight problems on the one hand and for larger scale
real life problems on the other hand.
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